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An empirical issue is whether a mutual fund’s change in intertemporal risk is 
intentional or arises from risk mean reversion. Our methodology uses actual fund 
trades to identify funds that actively change risk. Funds that are statistically identified 
as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk 
mean reversion. Mostly, funds trade to reduce risk and, in particular, tracking error 
variance. This is most evident for funds that previously attained a low tracking error 
variance. We find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended 
changes to return variance or tracking error variance. 
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A mutual fund manager’s compensation is a function of the assets under 
management with investors providing more money to the better performing funds. In 
response, managers who are underperforming may attempt to increase returns by 
increasing the risk of their portfolio. Or, if tenure is a concern, they may instead 
reduce the risk to limit their losses. The risk of a mutual fund is a function of the 
variances and covariances of the stocks in the portfolio. Fund managers cannot change 
the variances or covariances of the individual stocks, but can change the risk of the 
fund by adding/deleting stocks or changing the proportion invested in each stock. The 
critical issue is how the changing proportions of the individual stocks affect the risk of 
the fund. 
 Several studies have examined whether mutual fund managers behave as 
though they are competing in a tournament, and whether their behavior is influenced 
by their interim relative performance. The results of this research are mixed. To 
investigate the relation between managerial risk taking and prior performance, 
changes to a fund’s risk that managers intend1 need to be distinguished from changes 
that occur through trades made for other reasons. Trades made for other reasons may 
cause mean reversion of risk. In the absence of a distinction between trades that result 
in risk mean reversion and trades intended to change risk, a spurious association 
                                                
1 Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) also refer to “intended” risk taking; however, they use this 
terminology only to distinguish changes to risk caused by a fund’s trades from risk changes caused by 
changes in the risk of the stocks in the fund’s portfolio. With this usage, all trades would be classed as 
intended to change a fund’s risk. However, we use the terminology to make the distinction between 
trades that were designed or intended to change a fund’s risk and trades made for other reasons that 
change a fund’s risk. 
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between risk changes and prior returns may be concluded.2 Brown, Harlow, and 
Starks (1996) use total return variances in their examination of tournament behavior, 
while Chevalier and Ellison (1997) develop their model relative to tracking error 
variance.3 There is continuing debate over which of these measures of risk is 
appropriate and whether these risks mean revert.  
Previous studies do not make a distinction between intended and unintended 
changes to a fund’s risk. A significant contribution of our paper is to address this 
shortcoming by identifying mutual funds that intentionally increase or decrease fund 
risk. We adapt the procedure in Cullen, Gasbarro, and Monroe (2010) by first 
determining the contribution that each stock in the portfolio makes to the overall risk. 
Then we rank the individual stocks on the risk contribution from low to high risk and 
partition the stocks into 20 equal value buckets. We regress the net value of the trades 
in each bucket made during the period on the risk contribution for each bucket. Since 
the stocks have been ranked on risk, unless trades to change risk dominate, no relation 
will be found between the trades and the risk measure. This method allows us to test 
for statistical significance, on a fund-by-fund basis, whether the risk for each fund-
period has intentionally been changed. A significantly positive coefficient indicates a 
fund made trades to increase its risk, while a significantly negative coefficient 
indicates a fund made trades to reduce its risk.  
We investigate the relation between fund risk taking and prior return on a 
moving quarterly basis. This is appropriate because investors wishing to switch funds 
                                                
2 Schwarz (2009) cautions that previous studies that sorted on a fund’s prior return may have 
simultaneously sorted on risk, and the finding that fund managers increase their risk following poor 
performance could be due to mean reversion of risk. 
3 Tracking error variance is defined as the variance of the difference between fund return and market 
return. The managers of index funds attempt to reduce tracking error variance to zero.  
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may consult the frequent rankings by information providers such as Lipper Analytical 
Services and Morningstar. We use the quarterly stockholdings of 2836 mutual funds 
between 1991 and 2006 as reported by Thomson Financial Services Inc., resulting in 
49,673 fund-periods in our analysis.  
 Our results show that some funds deliberately decrease, while others 
deliberately increase, both tracking error variance and return variance. Unlike 
previous studies that have implicitly assumed equal numbers of risk-increasing and 
risk-reducing funds based on the median risk change, we find substantially more 
funds trade to reduce rather than to increase tracking error variance. This is 
particularly noticeable in funds with low initial tracking error variances. The 
propensity to reduce or increase both return variance and tracking error variance, 
however, varies over time. Funds trade stocks for various reasons that are not 
deliberately designed to alter the risk of their portfolios. Attributable to such trades, as 
a group, funds exhibit mean reversion of risk. However, those that we identify as 
trading to intentionally increase or decrease risk do not exhibit mean reversion. We 
also find no relation between prior returns and changes in return variance and tracking 
error risk changes.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the literature and 
develop our empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology, 
while Section 4 provides the empirical results. We conduct robustness tests in Section 
5 and conclude the study in Section 6. 
 
2. Literature and empirical predictions 
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) report empirical evidence that managers 
with poor relative performance in the first part of the year trade securities to increase 
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the return of their portfolios during the latter part of the year. During this process, the 
variance of fund returns also increases. Their measure of risk change is the ratio of the 
fund’s standard deviation of returns (return variance) over the last part of the year 
relative to the first part of the year. These authors argue that underperforming 
managers may trade securities that cause an increase in the risk of their fund. 
Hereafter, we refer to predictions of this outcome as the “tournament hypothesis.” 
Taylor (2003), however, argues that this tournament behavior may instead lead to the 
opposite outcome. He argues that it is rational for winning managers to anticipate that 
underperforming managers will increase their risk and do so themselves to maintain 
their ranking. If underperforming managers anticipate the reaction of the winners, 
they may instead decrease risk. 
Considering both total and systematic risk, Koski and Pontiff (1999) find a 
negative relation between a fund’s risk and prior performance. Furthermore, this 
relation is robust to a fund’s use of derivatives. Busse (2001) and Goriaev, Nijman, 
and Werker (2005) attribute the Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Koski and 
Pontiff (1999) findings to biases in estimating return variance caused by the 
autocorrelation and cross-correlation of fund returns. Allowing for these biases, using 
either daily or monthly fund returns to compute fund return variances, they are unable 
to support the finding of tournament behavior.  
The econometric difficulties associated with autocorrelation and cross-
correlation of fund returns are avoided by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) by calculating 
fund risk from the individual stocks they hold. To focus on managers’ risk-taking 
behavior, they use the change in the standard deviation of the difference in fund 
returns and market returns over time. Referred to as “tracking error variance,” this 
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measure is calculated by weighting the covariances of the time series of excess returns 
of the individual stocks in the fund’s portfolio.  
Chen and Pennacchi (2009) develop a model that shows tracking error 
variance is the more appropriate measure of risk. Empirically, they find that when a 
fund is performing poorly, fund managers tend to increase tracking error variance 
rather than focusing on total return variance. Fund managers performing poorly will 
maintain their poor position if they simply track the market in the subsequent period. 
In an attempt to improve their position, they select securities without consideration of 
the market index. More recently, Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) 
and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) follow Chevalier and Ellison (1997) by using 
portfolio holdings to calculate fund risk. Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge 
(2010) find that underperforming managers decrease the systematic and total risk of 
their portfolios, while Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) find that underperforming 
managers may either increase or decrease the fund’s risk depending on whether 
concerns for compensation or tenure dominate. 
Previous research has considered whether changes to fund risk are motivated 
by tournament behavior. However, changes to a fund’s risk may also arise from trades 
that are motivated by reasons other than tournament behavior, such as portfolio 
rebalancing and changing industry weightings. Indeed, almost every purchase/sell 
decision causes a change in both a fund’s return variance and its tracking error 
variance.4 Such trades produce, on average, mean reversion of fund return variances. 
This follows because high (low) risk funds hold stocks with high (low) variances 
and/or covariances, and trading that is not intended to alter a fund’s risk will occur 
                                                
4 Huang, Sialm, and Zhang (2009) support this view, noting that a fund manager may trade to exploit 




predominantly in stocks with lower (higher) variances and/or covariances than those 
in the extant portfolio.5  
While security trading causes fund risk to change, it is an empirical issue as to 
whether the change in risk is intentional or simply reflects risk mean reversion. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find no evidence of mean reversion. However, Koski 
and Pontiff (1999) and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) find the opposite. 
The central focus of this research is to identify fund-period where the trades 
are designed to alter the fund’s return variance or tracking error variance. By 
identifying funds whose trades have intentionally changed risk, we eliminate mean 
reversion as the cause of the risk changes. 
 
3. Data description and methodology 
3.1. Data description 
We obtain the periodic stockholdings of all US equity mutual funds for the 
period January 1991–June 2006 from Thomson Financial Services Ltd. Fund 
transactions are inferred from changes to the holdings, which are most commonly 
                                                
5 Simulations are performed for both return variance and tracking error variance. We simulate the effect 
of “random” trading on a fund portfolio’s return (tracking error) variance by creating a randomly drawn 
“universe” of 100 stocks. The random selection process involves sampling from the CRSP database 
stocks with 60 consecutive monthly returns preceding an arbitrary date and choosing every 30th stock 
after ordering on PERMNO. From this universe of stocks we create 5000 equally weighted portfolios 
of 10 stocks and compute the portfolio’s return (tracking error) variance. We replace one stock in each 
portfolio with another drawn from the universe and recalculate the portfolio’s return (tracking error) 
variance. The change to each portfolio return (tracking error) variance is used as the independent 
variable that is regressed on the initial portfolio return (tracking error) variance to simulate the 
regression of ∆SD (∆TESD) on SDt-1 (TESDt-1). The coefficient on SDt-1 (TESDt-1) is significantly 
negative, consistent with mean reversion of return (tracking error) variance.  
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reported quarterly, while allowing for stock capitalization changes. The holdings data 
are combined with monthly stock price and return data from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Mutual Fund Links is used to match the Thomson 
holdings with the monthly fund returns obtained from the CRSP database. 
To ensure that the data adequately represent mutual fund holdings, the sample 
is restricted to funds with average equity holdings exceeding 80% and average cash 
holdings below 10% of total fund assets. Start-of-period CRSP stock prices are used 
with the Thomson holdings data to calculate the net tangible asset values of each 
mutual fund. These calculated values are compared with actual net tangible asset 
values, and the fund is excluded if the discrepancy exceeds 10%. The final data set 
consists of 2836 funds with 49,673 fund-periods. The number of fund-periods reduces 
to 24,727 for the regressions that require the matching of fund returns and control 
variable data. In the regressions that follow, the sample size varies because of missing 
fund-return data. In addition, smaller sample sizes occur because not all funds 
intentionally change risk. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
The change in a fund’s risk is an ambiguous signal because risk can be 
changed intentionally or can occur due to mean reversion. However, if we examine 
the stocks that were traded, additional insights can be obtained. We present a method 
below that statistically identifies trades that are intended to change the risk of the 
fund. 
 
3.2.1. Identification of trades that intentionally change return variance and tracking 
error variance  
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Virtually all trades conducted by a fund will alter the fund’s return variance. 
The traditional variance, as shown in Eq. (1), can be decomposed to reveal the 











     (1)
 
where:  n  = number of stocks held during the period; 
 xi = proportion by value that stock i comprises at the start of period t; 
 xk = proportion by value that stock k comprises at the start of period t; 
 rit = monthly returns of stock i over the previous 60 months; 
 rkt = monthly returns of stock k over the previous 60 months; 
X

 = vector of portfolio weights (xit’s) for stock i held by fund j at the start 
of period t; 




 = vector of return variance contributions. 
By calculating T

(see equation [2]), we can identify the return variance 
contributions (RVCs) corresponding to each stock. This matrix manipulation 
essentially converts a complex function of variances and covariances into a function 
that is linear in the “contributions.” The variance of returns of each mutual fund’s 
equity portfolio at the start of each period is calculated by value weighting the 
covariances of the returns of the stocks in the fund measured over the previous 60 
months.6 Following Chevalier and Ellison (1997), the return variances at the end of 
                                                
6 Stocks without a minimum of 6 months of returns are eliminated. If more than 10% of the stocks by 
value are eliminated, then the fund-period is removed from consideration. Five years of monthly or 
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each period are calculated by maintaining the same covariances, while using end-of-
period proportionate values. Stocks that are acquired during a period are included in 
the calculation of the covariances. 
Since our aim is to identify trading designed to deliberately increase/decrease 
return variance, we focus on Eq. (2). The RVCs are the elements of the vector T

 for 














     (2)
 
 
We use the RVCs of the stocks held by a fund at the start of a period as the 
ranking variable prior to the assignment of these stocks to 20 equal value buckets. The 
RVC of each bucket will reflect the RVCs of the stocks it contains.7 For any particular 





















                                                                                                                                        
weekly data are generally used by practitioners or investment advisory services such as Value Line, 
Morningstar, and Merrill Lynch. 
7 The number of stocks in each bucket varies depending on the total number of stocks in the funds and 
the market value of the stocks in each bucket. For example, for a hypothetical portfolio of 200 stocks, 
each of the 20 buckets will have about 10 stocks if their market values are reasonably similar. 
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and  t;period ofstart  at the held j)bucket   to(belonging istock  of valueheldstockValue








Trades that are made over the period change the weightings on the RVC of 
stock i and, as a consequence, cause the RVC of bucket j to change. To determine the 
nature of the trades, the value of the trades over the period in each bucket j is 
regressed on the RVCs of the buckets at the start of the period.  
jjj RVCValueTrade ++=     (4) 






We contend that if the regression coefficient on RVCj is significantly positive 
(negative), then the trades were made with the intention to increase (decrease) risk. If, 
however, the coefficient is not significant, the trades were not intended to change the 
risk of the fund. Following Cullen, Gasbarro, and Monroe (2010), we perform repeat 
regressions, one for each fund-period, of the value of the stocks in a bucket that were 
traded8 during a period on the average of the ranking risk variable for each bucket. In 
calculating the value of the stocks traded, buy trades are assigned a positive and sell 
trades a negative value. By construction, there is no initial relation between the value 
of each bucket and the ranking variable, such that the regression will reveal an 
association that is attributable to the trading during the period. 
The other measure of portfolio risk is tracking error variance. Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) define tracking error variance as;  
)rVar(rTEV mjj −≡      (5)
 
                                                
8 Similar to Cullen, Gasbarro, and Monroe (2010), we jointly rank stocks that are held at the start of a 
period with those acquired during the period such that they are also assigned to buckets. 
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where rj and rm are the monthly returns for fund j and the value-weighted market 
index, respectively. Analogous calculations are made to determine the vector of each 
stock’s contribution to the variance of the tracking error of fund j during period t, 








    (6) 
where:  rmt = monthly market returns over the previous 60 months. 
This equation is similar to Eq. (2), but excess returns are used in the 
calculations. It provides the tracking error variance contribution (TEVC) for each 
stock in the fund and allows ranking on this risk measure. By symmetry, TEVC 
replaces RVC in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). Similar to Eq. (4), if the regression coefficient on 
TEVCj is significantly positive (negative) at the 10% level, then the trades were made 
with the intention to increase (decrease) tracking error risk. If, however, the 
coefficient is not significant, the trades were not intended to change the TEV of the 
fund. 
These regressions are performed on each of the 49,673 fund-periods between 
January 1991 and June 2006. We refer to the coefficients associated with RVC and 
TEVC as RVCBeta(s) and TEVCBeta(s), respectively. The number of RVCBetas 
(TEVCBetas) that are significantly different from zero could have occurred as a 
random event. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine whether the 
observed number of significant RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) occur by chance. The 
number of regressions is used as the number of trials, the level of significance at 
which we find the RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) to be positive or negative as the 
probability of a success, while the critical number of successes corresponds to a 




3.2.2. Trades intentionally changing return variance and tracking error variance—
prior returns and risk mean reversion 
Return variances and tracking error variances are converted into standard 
deviations, SD and TESD, respectively, to follow Chevalier and Ellison (1997). These 
start- and end-of-period SDs and TESDs are used to calculate changes in the 
portfolios’ standard deviation, SD, and tracking error standard deviation, TESD. 
Funds with significant return variance contribution betas and tracking error 
variance contribution betas are classified as deliberately trading to change their risk. 
For both risk measures, the funds are classified as increasing or decreasing risk 
according to the sign of the corresponding beta. These binary outcomes are logistically 
regressed on the return performance of the mutual funds over the preceding 9-, 6-, and 
3-month intervals. If prior returns are motivating their risk-changing behavior, then a 
relation between preceding months’ returns and the sign of the RVCBeta and the 
TEVCBeta should be evident. Furthermore, the tournament hypothesis predicts the 
relation to be negative, with funds that are underperforming (outperforming) their 
competitors increasing (decreasing) the risk of their funds.  
Logistic regressions are used to estimate Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), where, 
respectively, RVCBeta and TEVCBeta take on values of +1 (−1) if the coefficient is 
significantly positive (negative). Equations (7) and (8) are estimated using only those 
funds that have statistically increased or decreased their portfolio’s SD and TESD.  
jtjt5jt4t31jt21jt10jt SizebTObMRbSDbRbaRVCBeta ++++++= −−    (7) 
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Separate regressions are performed for returns over the previous 9-, 6-, and 3-
month periods. If managers engage in tournament behavior, prior returns influence 
their decisions to change the risk of their funds and a negative relation is expected 
between returns and risk. The coefficient associated with SDjt-1 and TESDjt-1 will be 
positive (negative) if managers achieve their intention of increasing (decreasing) the 
risk of high-risk portfolios and decreasing (increasing) the risk of low-risk portfolios. 
Equation (7) includes the return standard deviation, and Eq. (8) includes both the 
return standard deviation and tracking error standard deviation at the start of each 
period as independent variables.  
The market index return is used as a control variable and is expected to be 
positively related to the risk measures. When the market is increasing (decreasing), 
investors are more willing to assume more (less) risk. Portfolio turnover is included 
because managers engaging in tournament behavior may be more likely to actively 
trade and because return may be a function of trading volume. Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) caution that larger funds may tend to engage in less risk adjustment than 
smaller funds; therefore, size (corrected for growth over time) is also included as a 
control variable. 
 
3.2.3. Robustness test: Mean reversion of return variance and tracking error variance  
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Equations (7) and (8) consider only funds that intentionally trade to change risk. 
Now we consider the entire sample of mutual fund trades. If a fund’s trades cause the 
return variance and tracking error variance to be mean reverting, then the change in 
return standard deviation (∆SDt) and tracking error standard deviation (∆TESDt) 
should be negatively related to the start-of-period return standard deviation and 
tracking error standard deviation, respectively. We examine this relation by estimating 
Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), which are described in the following section.  
 
3.2.4. Robustness test: Prior performance and changes to return variance and 
tracking error variance  
We investigate how return variance and tracking error variance are related to the 
return performance of a mutual fund over the preceding 9-, 6-, and 3-month intervals. 
The tournament hypothesis predicts a negative relation between prior period returns 
and changes to fund risk as measured by SD and TESD. Consistent with Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997), it is expected that funds underperforming (outperforming) their 
competitors will increase (decrease) the risk of their funds. 
To achieve this, we estimate Eq. (9) and Eq. (10): 
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Equation (9) includes the return standard deviation, and Eq. (10) includes both 
the return standard deviation and the tracking error standard deviation at the start of 
each period. The control variables are the same as those previously used in Eq. (7) and 
Eq. (8).  
 
3.2.5. Additional robustness tests  
  Five additional tests shed light on the robustness of the results. We examine 
the impact of multicollinearity in the logistic regression; whether the results change if 
continuous dependent variables replace the respective logistic risk measures; whether 
the results are sensitive to quarterly or semiannual mutual fund reporting; the effect of 
excluding index funds and using 36 months of returns to calculate variances. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 2836 funds involving 49,673 
fund-periods between 1991 and 2006. The market capitalization distribution is highly 
skewed, reflecting a few very large funds. Fund market capitalization increased 
markedly over the period as the stock market increased and as more funds flowed into 
the industry. The period over which we examine the funds’ trades is most commonly 
either 90 days (66%) or 180 days (27%). The distributions of return and tracking error 
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standard deviations are less skewed than those of the corresponding variances, which 
supports our use of standard deviations in our subsequent analyses. The standard 
deviations of returns and tracking errors at the start of a trading period are highly 
correlated (0.780) as are the changes to these over the trading period (0.845). The 
distribution of the correlations between the returns of a mutual fund and the market 
has an average (median) of 0.849 (0.888). 
[Insert Table 1] 
4.2. Identification of trades that intentionally change return variance and tracking 
error variance  
To determine if there is a relation between the proportion of stocks traded 
during a period and the stock’s return variance contribution, 49,673 univariate linear 
regressions are performed. Each regression is for one fund-period, and fund-periods 
with return variance contribution betas (RVCBeta) significant at the 10% level (two-
tailed) are identified. A repeat set of regressions using tracking error variance 
contribution are performed to determine the tracking error variance contribution betas 
(TEVCBeta). Table 2 reports the pooled count of significant regression coefficients 
(betas) over the 16-year period. A negative beta indicates trading that reduces the 
return variance or tracking error variance of a fund’s portfolio. Funds exhibiting 
significant negative betas are preferentially purchasing stocks with low return variance 
contributions (tracking error variance contributions) or selling stocks with high return 
variance contributions (tracking error variance contributions), or both.  
[Insert Table 2] 
The binomial distribution is used to determine whether the frequency of the 
significant RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) differs from that expected by random occurrence. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that both negative and positive significant return variance 
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betas exceed the corresponding 1% cumulative binomial critical values. At 14.3%, 
almost twice as many funds trade to decrease the fund’s return variance9 compared to 
the 7.9% that trade to increase the fund’s return variance. This indicates that trading to 
alter a fund’s total risk is less common than is implicitly assumed in other studies, 
such as that of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), who classify 50% of funds as risk 
increasing and 50% as risk decreasing. 
Moreover, in Panel A of Table 2, of the 49,673 TEVCBeta regression 
coefficients, 23.5% are significantly negative, which also exceeds the 1% cumulative 
binomial critical value. Correspondingly, 4.4% of the coefficients are significantly 
positive and statistically below the number that would be expected by chance. 
Therefore, the implicit assumption in previous studies that funds “game” tracking 
error by increasing or decreasing tracking error variance with similar propensity is not 
supported empirically. Moreover, funds are more concerned with reducing tracking 
error variance, while those trading to increase tracking error variance are relatively 
rare. Indeed, as shown in Panel B, funds in the lowest tracking error variance pentile 
are 7.5 times as likely to decrease as to increase tracking error variance. This is 
consistent with funds whose aim it is to reduce tracking error variance achieving this 
goal over time. 
  The annual breakdown of RVCBeta and TEVCBeta is shown in Panel C of 
Table 2. The counts are time variant, but negative RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) occur 
more frequently than random expectations in all years. The frequency of funds that 
trade to increase tracking error variance (positive TEVCBetas) is generally lower than 
                                                
9 The funds of interest are those that conduct their trades to change return variance that we can 
statistically confirm at the 10% level. Clearly, other funds may also trade to alter return variance, but 
this relation is either nonlinear or not statistically significant. 
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random expectation. The proportions of RVCBetas (TEVCBetas) vary gradually over 
time, and notably, the proportions of negative and positive betas are negatively 
correlated. That is, when more fund managers trade to increase risk, fewer trade to 
decrease risk and vice versa. Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009) report variation in the 
relation between past performance and managerial risk-taking behavior over time, in 
response to overall market performance. Our focus on intentional risk-increasing or -
decreasing trades supports their finding of time variation in fund manager behavior. 
 
4.3. Trades that intentionally change return variance and tracking error variance—
mean reversion and prior returns  
The regressions, discussed earlier, statistically identify those funds that 
deliberately trade to change the risk of the fund. The results of the binary logistic 
regression of RVCBeta on prior returns, start-of-period return standard deviation, and 
control variables defined by Eq. (7) are provided in Table 3. Model 1 includes 10,786 
fund-periods with significantly negative or positive RVCBetas. The sample is reduced 
to 5444 fund-periods when matching prior returns are required for Model 2.  
[Insert Table 3] 
The coefficient on the SDjt-1 variable is insignificant in all models. If managers 
of funds with high (low) return variance intend to reduce (increase) the funds’ return 
variance, this relation will be negative, and conversely, will be positive if managers of 
high (low) return variance funds seek to increase (decrease) return variance. While our 
method focuses on intended trades, we note the possibility that random trades might 
produce a significantly negative relation through mean reversion. However, this 
possibility is not supported by the absence of a significant negative relation in our 
results. The coefficients for prior returns are insignificant for 9, 6, and 3 months and 
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do not support the tournament hypothesis in which underperforming fund managers 
increase risk.  
Table 4 provides results for analogous logistic regressions where the 
dependent variable is TEVCBeta using values that are significantly positive or 
negative. In Model 1, the 13,531 significant TEVCBetas are obtained from the sample 
of 48,44910 fund-periods, while in Model 2 the 6782 significant TEVCBetas are 
obtained from the 24,727 fund periods. The coefficient on the start-of-period tracking 
error standard deviation is significantly positive in all models. It is, therefore, 
inconsistent with mean reversion of tracking error variance. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Cognizant of the result in Panel B of Table 2, the positive coefficient on 
TESDjt-1 in Table 4 provides further support for the conclusion that funds with low 
tracking error variances are deliberately seeking to reduce tracking error variance 
further. This is consistent with the expectation that funds that exhibit trading aimed at 
reducing tracking error variance would, over time, tend to have lower tracking error 
variances. Notably, no evidence of tournament behavior is found in the relation 
between intentional changes to tracking error variance and prior return.  
In Tables 3 and 4, the RVCBeta and TEVCBeta are respectively significantly 
positively related to market return. This is consistent with our expectation that better 
performing markets increase the fund managers’ appetite for risk. We also find that 
turnover is negatively related to both RVCBeta and TEVCBeta. Therefore, contrary to 
the concern that more actively managed funds have a greater tendency to increase risk, 
it appears they more commonly trade to reduce risk. Fund size is positively related to 
                                                
10 Refer to Table 5, model 1. 
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RVCBeta and TEVCBeta, suggesting that larger funds intentionally adjust risk more 
than smaller funds.  
 
4.4. Dependence of changes to tracking error variance on changes to return variance 
Of the 11,008 fund-periods with significant RVCBetas and 13,842 fund-
periods with significant TEVCBetas reported in Table 2, 6127 fund-periods exhibit 
both significant RVCBetas and TEVCBetas.11 That is, with statistical confidence, 
these funds trade to simultaneously alter return variance and tracking error variance. 
This finding indicates that some fund managers simultaneously alter both risks, 
although not necessarily in the same direction.  
 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1. Return variance and tracking error variance—mean reversion and prior returns  
Table 5 reports the regression results for Eq. (9), where the change in return 
standard deviation is the dependent variable. The highly significant negative 
coefficient on the start-of-period return standard deviation in all models provides 
strong evidence that return variance is mean reverting. Model 1 is estimated using 
48,449 fund-periods.12 As before, in order to incorporate the tournament hypothesis, 
prior returns are needed, and Model 2 uses the subsample of 24,727 fund-periods for 
which we can match 9-month prior returns.  
                                                
11 The number of fund-periods differs from Tables 3 and 4 because we do not lose observations through 
matching control variables. 
12 We lose observations because we match the control variables. Furthermore, the number of 




The significantly positive signs on prior returns do not support the tournament 
hypothesis that fund managers increase the risk of their portfolios following relatively 
poor performance. Rather, our results more closely resemble those of Elton, Gruber, 
Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010). The addition of fund performance over the 
previous 9, 6, and 3 months in Models 3, 4, and 5, respectively, contributes little to the 
explanatory power of the model as indicated by the adjusted r-square. As expected, the 
market return control variable is significantly positively related to the change in return 
standard deviation. Contrary to our earlier result that focused on intentional risk 
changes, fund size is negatively related to risk. Turnover appears to be weakly 
positively related to risk. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 reports the regression results for Eq. (10), where the change in the 
tracking error standard deviation is the dependent variable. Model 1 uses 48,441 fund-
periods, but the sample is reduced to 24,725 fund-periods for Model 2. A highly 
significant negative coefficient associated with the start-of-period tracking error 
standard deviation indicates that the change in tracking error standard deviation is 
strongly mean reverting. As above, the addition of prior return performance in Models 
3, 4, and 5 contributes little to the explanatory power of the model.13 The size and 
significance of the coefficients on the control variables of market return, fund 
turnover, and size are similar to the results shown in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 6] 
                                                
13 The standardized coefficients (not shown) on start-of-period tracking error standard deviation 
indicate that it contributes to 23% of the explained change in the tracking error standard deviation 
compared with less than 6% for prior returns. 
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It is possible that the analyses we present in Tables 3 and 4 are based on funds 
that experience large changes to return and tracking error variance as a consequence of 
using fund-periods with statistically significant RVCBetas and TEVCBetas. Funds 
with large changes to return and tracking error variance may produce results that differ 
from those we report in Tables 5 and 6. Accordingly, we repeat these analyses firstly 
using only the top and bottom pentiles and secondly using only the top and bottom 
deciles of the dependent variables in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), and obtain similar results. In 
summary, irrespective of whether return variance or tracking error variance is used, 
the results support risk mean reversion but are not consistent with the tournament 
hypothesis. 
 
5.2. Multicollinearity in logistic regression 
The SDjt-1 and TESDjt-1 terms in Eq. (8) are highly correlated.14 This may lead 
to erroneous conclusions regarding the statistical significance of the independent 
variables and incorrect estimates of the coefficients in the logistic regression reported 
in Table 4. Our large sample size reduces this potential, but nonetheless, we repeat this 
regression twice, omitting each term in turn. The coefficient on TESDjt-1 increases, 
with increased statistical significance when the SDjt-1 term is omitted. When the 
TESDjt-1 term is omitted, the coefficient on SDjt-1 also increases in size and statistical 
significance, in effect taking the place of TESDjt-1. Accordingly, we are satisfied that 
our qualitative interpretation remains valid. 
 
                                                
14 As indicated in Table 1, SD and TESD have a correlation of 0.780, which is significant at 1%. 
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5.3. Intentional return variance and tracking error variance changes using continuous 
dependent variables 
By using a logistic regression model to test the relation between statistically 
significant RVCbetas, TEVCbetas, and the explanatory variables, we reduce our 
sample size. Since this procedure may reduce the power of our analysis, we perform 
additional analyses using a two-stage process. First, we repeat our suite of regressions 
using Eq. (4), to obtain the statistical confidences that the RVCbeta (TEVCbeta) are 
different from zero and code these as either positive or negative according to the sign 
of the coefficient. We interpret these as probabilities that a fund’s trades were 
conducted to intentionally increase (positive) or decrease (negative) the return 
(tracking error) variance. Second, we use these values as regressands to reestimate Eq. 
(7) and Eq. (8). In effect, we have derived continuous dependent variables and use our 
entire sample. 
These supplementary regressions produce qualitatively similar results to the 
logistic regressions we report in Tables (3) and (4). They confirm that we have not 
biased our analyses by focusing only on trades statistically identified as intended to 
change fund risk. 
 
5.4. Impact of pooling different trading periods 
In our analyses, we pooled the trades of funds that report their holdings 
quarterly and semiannually. The trades of funds that report quarterly are sampled more 
frequently than those reported semiannually; however, the latter are more likely to 
have larger changes in their holdings. This heterogeneity may bias the results. 
Accordingly, we repeat our analyses using homogenized subsamples of quarterly and 
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semiannual trading periods. The results for each subsample are qualitatively similar to 
those from our pooled sample. 
 
5.5. Excluding index funds and using 36 months of returns to calculate variances 
By excluding index funds from our analyses we can focus on funds that are 
actively managed and may be more likely to exhibit tournament behavior. This 
constraint reduces our sample from 49,673 to 47,504 fund-periods, but qualitatively 
the results remain the same. Accordingly, we conclude that the small number of index 
funds in our sample plays a negligible role in the results. 
It is possible that fund managers place more emphasis on recent data and pay 
more attention to variances and covariances calculated over a shorter period. Similar 
to Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010), we use 36 months of return data 
to recalculate return and tracking error variances, covariances, and variance 
contributions. Comparing the continuous dependent variable described in Section 5.3 
produced using 60 months and 36 months to calculate variance contributions, we find 
correlations of 0.89 for return variance and 0.84 for tracking error variance.15 
Accordingly, when we repeat our analyses using these variances and covariances, we 
generate results qualitatively equivalent to those in Tables (2) to (6). 
 
6. Conclusions 
                                                
15 Seventy percent of the fund-periods we statistically identify as trading to either increase or decrease 
tracking error variance when we calculate variance contribution using 36 months are similarly 
classified using 60 months. For return variance, the corresponding proportion is 68%. However, many 
fund-periods classed as trading to increase or decrease risk on one calculation miss the statistical cut of 
90% confidence on the other. If the statistical confidence requirement is reduced from 90% to 80% 
(two-tailed), then these proportions increase to 84% for both risk measures. 
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 Trading by a fund alters the composition of the assets in its portfolio and 
changes its return variance and tracking error variance. Managers may deliberately 
attempt to reduce the risk of their fund by actively purchasing low risk stocks or 
avoiding buying high risk stocks, or by using the opposite strategy to increase risk. 
The methodology developed in this study allows the identification of fund managers 
trading to deliberately change the risk of the fund and distinguishes these risk changes 
from those attributed to mean reversion. Funds that we statistically identify as trading 
to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean 
reversion. 
When fund managers trade with the intention to alter risk, we find that the 
dominant behavior in funds with low tracking error variance is to further reduce risk. 
Indeed, we find that, with statistical significance, 26.4% of the funds in the lowest 
pentile of start-of-period tracking error variance deliberately trade to decrease tracking 
error variance, while only 3.5% trade to increase this risk. Our finding does not 
preclude tournament behavior by fund managers, although the prevalence of funds 
that trade to reduce tracking error variance suggests it may be a secondary 
consideration among those that track the index. 
Focusing on funds that deliberately trade to change their risk, we find no 
evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return 
variance or tracking error variance. These results avoid the ambiguity of previous 
investigations of tournament behavior that do not distinguish deliberate from 
inadvertent risk changes. Overall, our method allows a more precise examination of 
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Descriptive statistics for mutual funds, 1991–2006 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Number of fund-periods 49,673   
Number of funds 2836   
Market capitalization ($ million)    
1991–1996 563.6 143.1 1688.5 
1997–2001 1216.8 229.2 4355.7 
2002–2006 1542.1 320.4 5379.8 
Number of stocks in portfolio 148.8 90.0 221.3 
Period (days) 117.3 92.0 42.7 
Return variance 0.00339 0.00257 0.00338 
Return standard deviation (SD) 0.05443 0.05069 0.02065 
∆ Return standard deviation (∆SD) -0.00010 0.00011 0.00592 
Tracking error variance 0.00122 0.00069 0.00208 
Tracking error standard deviation (TESD) 0.0297 0.0263 0.01828 
∆ Tracking error standard deviation (∆TESD) -0.00006 0.00008 0.00552 
Market return variance 0.00196 0.00208 0.00080 
Correlation (fund and market) 0.849 0.888 0.132 
Correlation (TESD and SD) 0.780***   
Correlation (∆TESD and ∆SD) 0.845***   
Fund tracking error variance is defined as )rrvar( mtjt −  and fund return variance as ),var( jtr  
where rjt and rmt are the monthly returns of stock j and the market, respectively, calculated over 






Significant variance contribution betas  
  Return Variance  
Contribution Beta 
Tracking Error Variance 
Contribution Beta 
Year N Negative (%) Positive (%) Negative (%) Positive (%) 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
1991–2006 49,673 14.3*** 7.9*** 23.5*** 4.4***L 
Panel B:  Prior Risk Pentiles 
Low Riska 9934 12.9*** 6.8*** 26.4*** 3.5***L 
 9935 12.3*** 7.2*** 22.9*** 4.0***L 
 9935 13.0*** 7.9*** 21.8*** 4.2***L 
 9935 15.2*** 8.7*** 23.3*** 4.7 
High Risk 9934 18.0*** 8.9*** 22.9*** 5.6*** 
Panel C:  Annual Breakdown 
1991 1159 8.6*** 11.6*** 18.6*** 4.9 
1992 1806 13.6*** 9.2*** 20.2*** 5.1 
1993 1982 14.7*** 5.1 22.7*** 4.0**L 
1994 2222 14.8*** 5.1 25.2*** 3.6***L 
1995 2579 19.0*** 4.8 28.3*** 2.5***L 
1996 2610 19.1*** 3.9***L 29.7*** 2.8***L 
1997 3519 15.6*** 6.4*** 25.0*** 4.0***L 
1998 3739 14.1*** 8.1*** 23.5*** 5.1 
1999 3537 11.4*** 10.0*** 23.1*** 5.2 
2000 4327 16.4*** 10.7*** 25.0*** 6.6*** 
2001 3848 15.2*** 10.1*** 27.0*** 5.0 
2002 4191 15.1*** 8.3*** 24.1*** 4.6 
2003 4059 13.5*** 10.2*** 20.0*** 4.9 
2004 4509 11.2*** 9.0*** 19.7*** 4.3**L 
2005 4372 11.9*** 4.9 20.0*** 2.8***L 
2006 1214 12.1*** 6.1** 22.2*** 3.1***L 
a Risk is either start-of-period return variance or tracking error variance depending on whether 
the percentages are for return variance contribution betas or for tracking error variance 
contribution betas, respectively. 
 
The number of statistically significant (10%) return variance contribution betas are generated 
from 49,673 linear regressions of: 
jjj RVCTradeValue ++=  
where: 
j.bucket  RVCin  stocks ofnumber  n
and ;)r,cov(rx RVCStock 
 t;period ofstart  at the held j)bucket   to(belonging istock  of valueheldstockValue





































Results for tracking error variance contribution beta are generated using an analogous 
methodology, which differs in that the market return is subtracted from the stock returns prior to 
calculating the return covariances. These are performed on 49,673 fund-periods between 
January 1991 and June 2006.  *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively, using the cumulative binomial distribution. L denotes occurrences less than what is 
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expected by random. 
Table 3 
Significant return variance contribution betas and prior returns, 1991–2006 
   Model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -1.064*** -1.348*** -1.340*** -1.373*** -1.289*** 
 (20.83) (15.79) (15.60) (16.29) (14.25) 
R9jt-1   0.163   
   (0.53)   
R6jt-1    0.122  
    (0.42)  
R3jt-1     -0.004 
     (0.00) 
SDjt-1 0.762 1.686 1.708 1.456 1.324 
 (0.62) (1.22) (1.25) (0.89) (0.70) 
MRt 0.072 0.585** 0.608** 0.599** 0.611** 
 (0.17) (5.89) (6.24) (6.05) (6.21) 
TOjt −1.112*** −0.932*** −0.928*** −0.915*** −0.923*** 
 (268.11) (91.54) (90.45) (87.83) (88.84) 
Sizejt 0.989*** 1.131*** 1.122*** 1.157*** 1.091*** 
 (19.86) (12.73) (12.50) (13.25) (11.70) 
N 10,786 5444 5444 5422 5396 
Cox & Snell R2 0.032 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 
Nagelkerke R2 0.044 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.030 
Logistic regression of: 
jtjt5jt4t31jt21jt10jt SizebTObMRbSDbRbaRVCBeta ++++++= −−  
where: 
 t.in period j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;in period j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; timereturn tomarket month -6MR
 t; periodofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standardreturn SD
 t; periodofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fundon return  excess annualizedR

























Significant tracking error variance contribution betas and prior returns, 1991–2006 
   Model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.420*** -2.886*** -2.882*** -2.858*** -2.886*** 
 (77.82) (52.51) (52.36) (51.04) (51.85) 
R9jt-1   0.074   
   (0.08)   
R6jt-1    0.011  
    (0.00)  
R3jt-1     -0.073 
     (0.22) 
TESDjt-1 6.109*** 6.091* 5.942* 5.946* 6.734** 
 (7.27) (3.60) (3.34) (3.34) (4.32) 
SDjt-1 9.783*** 12.673*** 12.799*** 12.386*** 11.93*** 
 (23.62) (20.58) (20.47) (19.05) (17.78) 
MRt 0.387* 0.986*** 0.999*** 0.959*** 0.974*** 
 (3.36) (11.02) (11.04) (10.10) (10.24) 
TOjt −2.049*** −2.024*** −2.022*** −2.032*** −2.036*** 
 (485.27) (229.70) (229.12) (228.78) (228.19) 
Sizejt 0.983*** 1.230*** 1.224*** 1.225*** 1.255*** 
 (13.95) (10.76) (10.62) (10.57) (11.09) 
N 13,531 6782 6782 6742 6723 
Cox & Snell R2 0.053 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.050 
Nagelkerke R2 0.090 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.085 









 t.in period j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;in period j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; timereturn tomarket month -6MR
 t; periodofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standardreturn SD
 t; periodofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standarderror  trackingTESD
 t; periodofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fundon return  excess annualizedR



















***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Wald statistic is 






Change to return variance—prior returns and risk mean reversion, 1991–2006 
   Model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 4.202*** 3.985*** 4.047*** 4.093*** 4.074*** 
 (14.29) (9.95) (10.10) (10.20) (10.18) 
R9jt-1   0.913***   
   (3.40)   
R6jt-1    1.523***  
    (6.62)  
R3jt-1     1.134*** 
     (7.16) 
SDjt-1 −63.134*** −61.110*** −61.112*** −61.780*** −61.452*** 
 (−49.10) (−33.08) (−33.09) (−33.24) (−32.65) 
MRt 8.55*** 8.964*** 9.133*** 9.232*** 9.240*** 
 (36.90) (29.97) (30.12) (30.45) (30.54) 
TOjt −0.009 0.203* 0.215* 0.211* 0.218* 
 (−0.10) (1.74) (1.84) (1.80) (1.88) 
Sizejt −1.366*** −1.316*** −1.378*** −1.392*** −1.398*** 
 (−4.88) (−3.51) (−3.67) (−3.71) (−3.74) 
N 48,449 24,727 24,727 24,578 24,532 
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.090 0.090 0.092 0.091 
Regression of: 
000,1/)SizebTObMRbSDbRb(aSD jtjt5jt4t31jt21jt10jt ++++++= −−  
where: 
 t.in period j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;in period j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; timereturn tomarket month -6MR
 t; periodofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standardreturn SD
 t; periodofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fundon return  excess annualizedR


























Change to tracking error variance—prior returns and risk mean reversion, 1991–2006  
   Model   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 4.826*** 4.544*** 4.647*** 4.691*** 4.681*** 
 (17.43) (12.21) (12.47) (12.59) (12.60) 
R9jt-1   1.223***   
   (4.86)   
R6jt-1    1.681***  
    (7.84)  
R3jt-1     1.357*** 
     (9.22) 
TESDjt-1 −71.960*** −71.142*** −73.365*** −75.007*** −73.896*** 
 (−30.22) (−22.92) (−23.39) (−23.96) (−23.76) 
SDjt-1 −5.973*** −7.46*** −5.983** −5.864** −7.080*** 
 (−2.85) (−2.78) (−2.22) (−2.17) (−2.64) 
MRt 3.272*** 3.213*** 3.417*** 3.435*** 3.405*** 
 (14.93) (11.51) (12.11) (12.18) (12.10) 
TOjt −0.196** −0.091 −0.076 −0.073 −0.064 
 (−2.45) (−0.84) (−0.71) (−0.67) (−0.59) 
Sizejt −2.547*** −2.245*** −2.360*** −2.371*** −2.341*** 
 (−9.59) (−6.41) (−6.72) (−6.76) (−6.71) 
N 48,441 24,725 24,725 24,576 24,530 







+++++=∆ −−−  
where: 
 t.in period j fund oftion capitaliza edstandardizSize
and  t;in period j fund of turnover portfolioTO
 t; timereturn tomarket month -6MR
 t; periodofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standardreturn SD
 t; periodofstart  at the j fund ofdeviation  standarderror  trackingTESD
 t; periodofstart   the tomonths 3or  6, 9,over  j fundon return  excess annualizedR


























>Risk mean reversion confounds examination of fund tournament behavior. 
>We develop a method to determine if mutual fund trades intentionally change risk. 
>We find funds mostly trade to reduce risk, especially tracking error variance. 
>Intended changes to risk are unrelated to past mutual fund performance. 
 
 
